Mitigating Backdoor Poisoning Attacks through the Lens of Spurious Correlation (2023.emnlp-main)
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| Challenge: | Modern NLP models are often trained over large untrustworthy datasets, raising the potential for a malicious adversary to compromise model behaviour. |
| Approach: | They propose to mitigate spurious correlations between textual triggers and classification labels by combining them with insertion-based attacks. |
| Outcome: | The proposed defence significantly reduces attack success rates across backdoor attacks and provides a near-perfect defence against insertion-based attacks. |
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Triggerless Backdoor Attack for NLP Tasks with Clean Labels (2022.naacl-main)
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Leilei Gan, Jiwei Li, Tianwei Zhang, Xiaoya Li, Yuxian Meng, Fei Wu, Yi Yang, Shangwei Guo, Chun Fan
| Challenge: | Backdoor attacks are a new threat to neural natural language processing models due to the fragility and lack of interpretability of NLP models. |
| Approach: | They propose a method to perform backdoor attacks without an external trigger . they propose to use clean-labeled examples to generate poisoned clean-labelled examples . |
| Outcome: | The proposed strategy is effective and hard to defend due to its triggerless nature. |
Be Careful about Poisoned Word Embeddings: Exploring the Vulnerability of the Embedding Layers in NLP Models (2021.naacl-main)
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| Challenge: | Recent studies reveal a security threat to natural language processing models, called the Backdoor Attack. |
| Approach: | They propose to hack a model by modifying one single word embedding vector without sacrificing accuracy on clean samples. |
| Outcome: | The proposed method is more efficient and stealthier on sentiment analysis and sentence-pair classification tasks. |
BITE: Textual Backdoor Attacks with Iterative Trigger Injection (2023.acl-long)
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| Challenge: | Existing methods to defend against backdoor attacks are based on model stealing, model thieving and training data extraction attacks. |
| Approach: | They propose a backdoor attack that poisons training data to establish strong correlations between the target label and a set of “trigger words” These trigger words are iteratively identified and injected into the target-label instances through natural word-level perturbations. |
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Textual Backdoor Attacks Can Be More Harmful via Two Simple Tricks (2022.emnlp-main)
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| Challenge: | Existing textual backdoor attacks are vulnerable to backdoors . researchers add extra training task to distinguish poisoned and clean data . |
| Approach: | They propose two tricks that make existing backdoor attacks much more harmful . first trick is to add an extra task to distinguish poisoned and clean data . second trick is using all the clean training data rather than the original clean data. |
| Outcome: | The proposed tricks can significantly improve attack performance in three tough situations including clean data fine-tuning, low-poisoning-rate, and label-consistent attacks. |
Large Language Models Are Better Adversaries: Exploring Generative Clean-Label Backdoor Attacks Against Text Classifiers (2023.findings-emnlp)
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| Challenge: | Backdoor attacks manipulate model predictions by inserting malicious "poison" instances that contain a specific pattern or "trigger." |
| Approach: | They propose an attack that inserts style-based triggers into training and test data by using a poison selection technique to improve the effectiveness of both LLMBkd and existing backdoor attacks. |
| Outcome: | The proposed attack achieves high success rates across a wide range of styles with little effort and no model training. |
Backdoor NLP Models via AI-Generated Text (2024.lrec-main)
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| Challenge: | Existing attacks disregard fluency and semantic fidelity of poisoned text, rendering it easily detectable. |
| Approach: | They propose to use AI-generated poisoned text to attack NLP models by establishing covert associations between trigger patterns and target labels without affecting normal accuracy. |
| Outcome: | The proposed method achieves effective attacks while maintaining fluency and semantic similarity across all scenarios. |
Rethinking Backdoor Detection Evaluation for Language Models (2025.emnlp-main)
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| Challenge: | Existing backdoor detection methods have high accuracy in detecting backdoored models, but they are not robust enough to detect backdoors in the wild. |
| Approach: | They examine the robustness of backdoor detectors by manipulating different factors during backdoor planting. |
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Expose Backdoors on the Way: A Feature-Based Efficient Defense against Textual Backdoor Attacks (2022.findings-emnlp)
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| Challenge: | Existing online backdoor defense methods for NLP models focus on anomalies at input or output level, causing fragility to adaptive attacks and high computational cost. |
| Approach: | They propose a feature-based online defense method to detect poisoned samples . they use a distance-based anomaly score to distinguish poisones from clean samples based on feature-level regularization . |
| Outcome: | The proposed method outperforms existing methods in sentiment analysis and offense detection tasks. |
Backdoor Attacks on Pre-trained Models by Layerwise Weight Poisoning (2021.emnlp-main)
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| Challenge: | Pre-trained models can be maliciously poisoned with certain triggers, causing a security threat. |
| Approach: | They propose a stronger weight poisoning attack method that introduces a layerwise weight poison strategy to plant deeper backdoors. |
| Outcome: | The proposed method can be widely applied and provide hints for future models robustness studies. |
PKAD: Pretrained Knowledge is All You Need to Detect and Mitigate Textual Backdoor Attacks (2024.findings-emnlp)
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| Challenge: | Current defense methods can be classified into inference-time and training-time ones based on their execution phase. |
| Approach: | They propose a two-stage poison detection strategy using pre-trained language models to detect poisoned samples before model training. |
| Outcome: | The proposed method achieves better performance than current methods more quickly and with fewer training costs. |