ACIArena: Toward Unified Evaluation for Agent Cascading Injection (2026.acl-long)
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Hengyu An, Minxi Li, Jinghuai Zhang, Naen Xu, Chunyi Zhou, Changjiang Li, Xiaogang Xu, Tianyu Du, Shouling Ji
| Challenge: | Existing studies consider only limited attack strategies and simplified MAS settings, limiting their generalizability and comprehensive evaluation. |
| Approach: | They propose a framework to evaluate the robustness of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) they propose unified evaluation suites spanning attack surfaces and attack objectives . |
| Outcome: | ACIArena provides a benchmark of 1,356 test cases for evaluating MAS robustness . it covers six widely used MAS implementations and provides measurable results . |
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