| Challenge: | Neural code search models are used to find code snippets from online repositories . however, their security aspect is rarely studied . |
| Approach: | They propose to use off-the-shelf code snippets from online repositories to find desired code . they propose to inject a backdoor into neural code search models which return buggy code if attacker modifies one variable/function name . |
| Outcome: | The proposed attack outperforms baselines on two neural code search models by 60%. |
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Rethinking Stealthiness of Backdoor Attack against NLP Models (2021.acl-long)
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| Challenge: | Existing backdoor attacks are not stealthy to system deployers or users. |
| Approach: | They propose a novel backdoor attack method based on negative data augmentation and modifying word embeddings that is much stealthier while maintaining pretty good attacking performance. |
| Outcome: | The proposed method is much stealthier while maintaining pretty good attacking performance. |
Hidden Killer: Invisible Textual Backdoor Attacks with Syntactic Trigger (2021.acl-long)
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| Challenge: | Existing methods for textual backdoor attacks insert additional contents into normal samples as triggers, causing detection and blocking of backdoors. |
| Approach: | They propose to use syntactic structure as trigger in textual backdoor attacks . they propose to achieve similar attack performance but have higher invisibility . |
| Outcome: | The proposed method achieves almost 100% success rate but has higher invisibility and stronger resistance to defenses than the insertion-based methods. |
Multi-target Backdoor Attacks for Code Pre-trained Models (2023.acl-long)
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| Challenge: | Existing work for backdoor attacks on neural code models insert triggers into task-specific data for code-related downstream tasks, limiting the scope of attacks. |
| Approach: | They propose task-agnostic backdoor attacks for code pre-trained models . they use two learning strategies to implant backdoors into code understanding and generation models - Poisoned Seq2Seq learning and token representation learning . |
| Outcome: | The proposed model is pre-trained with two learning strategies to support the multi-target attack of downstream code understanding and generation tasks. |
Expose Backdoors on the Way: A Feature-Based Efficient Defense against Textual Backdoor Attacks (2022.findings-emnlp)
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| Challenge: | Existing online backdoor defense methods for NLP models focus on anomalies at input or output level, causing fragility to adaptive attacks and high computational cost. |
| Approach: | They propose a feature-based online defense method to detect poisoned samples . they use a distance-based anomaly score to distinguish poisones from clean samples based on feature-level regularization . |
| Outcome: | The proposed method outperforms existing methods in sentiment analysis and offense detection tasks. |
Rethinking Backdoor Detection Evaluation for Language Models (2025.emnlp-main)
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| Challenge: | Existing backdoor detection methods have high accuracy in detecting backdoored models, but they are not robust enough to detect backdoors in the wild. |
| Approach: | They examine the robustness of backdoor detectors by manipulating different factors during backdoor planting. |
| Outcome: | The proposed methods are able to detect backdoors in the wild, but they lack robustness against backdoor attacks. |
Textual Backdoor Attacks Can Be More Harmful via Two Simple Tricks (2022.emnlp-main)
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| Challenge: | Existing textual backdoor attacks are vulnerable to backdoors . researchers add extra training task to distinguish poisoned and clean data . |
| Approach: | They propose two tricks that make existing backdoor attacks much more harmful . first trick is to add an extra task to distinguish poisoned and clean data . second trick is using all the clean training data rather than the original clean data. |
| Outcome: | The proposed tricks can significantly improve attack performance in three tough situations including clean data fine-tuning, low-poisoning-rate, and label-consistent attacks. |
Turn the Combination Lock: Learnable Textual Backdoor Attacks via Word Substitution (2021.acl-long)
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| Challenge: | Recent studies show that neural natural language processing models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. |
| Approach: | They propose to inject neural models with backdoors activated by word substitution . their results raise a serious alarm to the security of NLP models, they argue . |
| Outcome: | The proposed backdoors are activated by a learnable combination of word substitution and exhibit higher invisibility than previous methods. |
Claim-Guided Textual Backdoor Attack for Practical Applications (2025.findings-naacl)
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| Challenge: | a novel backdoor attack is based on textual claims to trick models into misbehaving on targeted claims. |
| Approach: | a new backdoor attack is designed to trick models into misbehaving on targeted claims . the code and data will be available at https://github.com/minkyoo9/CGBA . |
| Outcome: | a new backdoor attack exploits the power of textual claims to trick models into misbehaving on claims without affecting their performance on clean data. |
ChatGPT as an Attack Tool: Stealthy Textual Backdoor Attack via Blackbox Generative Model Trigger (2024.naacl-long)
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| Challenge: | Textual backdoor attacks are increasingly challenging to detect due to the use of advanced generative models such as GPT-4. |
| Approach: | They propose a framework that harnesses advanced generative models to execute stealthier backdoor attacks on text classifiers. |
| Outcome: | The proposed framework achieves state-of-the-art attack success rate of 97.35% over four sentiment classification tasks and four human cognition stealthiness tests. |
Backdoor NLP Models via AI-Generated Text (2024.lrec-main)
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| Challenge: | Existing attacks disregard fluency and semantic fidelity of poisoned text, rendering it easily detectable. |
| Approach: | They propose to use AI-generated poisoned text to attack NLP models by establishing covert associations between trigger patterns and target labels without affecting normal accuracy. |
| Outcome: | The proposed method achieves effective attacks while maintaining fluency and semantic similarity across all scenarios. |